144
Stevens, J., dissenting
1358] said that '§ 924(c)(1) is, at best, hard to follow in simple English . . .' With Mr. Godwin in front of me, I decline to hold him to a higher test than one found diffi-cult by appellate court judges." United States v. Godwin, 758 F. Supp. 281, 283 (ED Pa. 1991).
In an effort to cure § 924(c) of any ambiguity, the Court undertakes an intricate grammatical analysis, with an emphasis on the word "conviction." 9 According to the Court, the "conviction" referred to in § 924(c) must be a finding of guilt, preceding the entry of final judgment, because sentence is imposed with the final judgment; if "conviction" referred to the final judgment itself, there would be no opportunity for sentence enhancement. Ante, at 132. The "absurd[ity]" of this situation, ibid., which, I note, has thus far eluded all of the courts to apply § 924(c) as a recidivist
9 The Court also suggests that use of the word "conviction," rather than "offense," distinguishes this statute from the repeat offender provisions discussed in Gonzalez v. United States, 224 F. 2d 431 (CA1 1955), supra, at 138-139. Of course, the majority's textualist approach would lead to the same result if § 924(c)'s enhancement were reserved for "second or subsequent offenses": At the time of sentencing for two violations committed on separate dates, one violation is "second or subsequent" to the other, and the conviction itself always will establish that two "offenses" have indeed been committed. See ante, at 135.
It is true, as the Court points out in passionate defense of its reading, that the words "offense" and "conviction" are not identical. What is at issue here, however, is not whether the terms mean the same thing in all usages, but whether they mean the same thing when they are used by Congress to identify the class of repeat offenders subject to enhanced sentences. Cf. ante, at 131-132 (context gives meaning to word "conviction"). If there is any difference between the terms as so used, it only lends further support to the conclusion that § 924(c) is a recidivist provision. As discussed above, repeat offender statutes couched in terms of "offense" were understood at the time of § 924(c)'s enactment to identify offenses committed after a prior conviction. See supra, at 138-139. A fortiori, "use of the word 'conviction' rather than wording describing the offense suggests an intent to reach recidivists who repeat conduct after conviction in the judicial system for prior offenses." United States v. Godwin, 758 F. Supp. 281, 283 (ED Pa. 1991).
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