174
Opinion of the Court
hold information provided by that source. See, e. g., Irons v. FBI, 880 F. 2d 1446 (CA1 1989) (en banc). For present purposes, it suffices to note that, at the time an interview is conducted, neither the source nor the FBI agent ordinarily knows whether the communication will be disclosed in any of the aforementioned ways. Thus, an exemption so limited that it covered only sources who reasonably could expect total anonymity would be, as a practical matter, no exemption at all. Cf. John Doe, 493 U. S., at 152 (FOIA exemptions "are intended to have meaningful reach and application"). We therefore agree with the Court of Appeals that the word "confidential," as used in Exemption 7(D), refers to a degree of confidentiality less than total secrecy. A source should be deemed confidential if the source furnished information with the understanding that the FBI would not divulge the communication except to the extent the Bureau thought necessary for law enforcement purposes.
C
The Government objects to the Court of Appeals' requirement that it make an individualized showing of confidentiality with respect to each source. It argues that an assurance of confidentiality is " 'inherently implicit' " whenever a source cooperates with the FBI in a criminal investigation. Brief for Petitioners 18-20 (quoting Miller v. Bell, 661 F. 2d, at 627). The Government essentially contends that all FBI sources should be presumed confidential; the presumption could be overcome only with specific evidence that a particular source had no interest in confidentiality.
This Court previously has upheld the use of evidentiary presumptions supported by considerations of "fairness, public policy, and probability, as well as judicial economy." Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U. S. 224, 245 (1988). We also have recognized the propriety of judicially created presumptions under federal statutes that make no express provision
Page: Index Previous 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 NextLast modified: October 4, 2007