Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 11 (1993)

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Cite as: 508 U. S. 223 (1993)

Opinion of the Court

comment., n. 1(g), the six-point enhancement does not apply unless the use is "more than" brandishing. While pistol-whipping a victim with a firearm might be "more than" brandishing, scratching one's head is not.

In any event, the "intended purpose" of a firearm is not that it be used in any offensive manner whatever, but rather that it be used in a particular fashion—by firing it. The dissent's contention therefore cannot be that the defendant must use the firearm "as a weapon," but rather that he must fire it or threaten to fire it, "as a gun." Under the dissent's approach, then, even the criminal who pistol-whips his victim has not used a firearm within the meaning of § 924(c)(1), for firearms are intended to be fired or brandished, not used as bludgeons. It appears that the dissent similarly would limit the scope of the "othe[r] use[s]" covered by USSG § 2B3.1(b) (2)(B). The universal view of the courts of appeals, however, is directly to the contrary. No court of appeals ever has held that using a gun to pistol-whip a victim is anything but the "use" of a firearm; nor has any court ever held that trading a firearm for drugs falls short of being the "use" thereof. But cf. Phelps, 877 F. 2d, at 30 (holding that trading a gun for drugs is not use "in relation to" a drug trafficking offense).

To the extent there is uncertainty about the scope of the phrase "uses . . . a firearm" in § 924(c)(1), we believe the remainder of § 924 appropriately sets it to rest. Just as a single word cannot be read in isolation, nor can a single provision of a statute. As we have recognized:

"Statutory construction . . . is a holistic endeavor. A provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme— because the same terminology is used elsewhere in a context that makes its meaning clear, or because only one of the permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the law." United Savings Assn. of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood

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