FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 7 (1993)

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Cite as: 508 U. S. 307 (1993)

Opinion of the Court

"a naked intuition, unsupported by conceivable facts or policies," 296 U. S. App. D. C. 141, 143, 965 F. 2d 1103, 1105 (1992), and held that "the Cable Act violates the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment, insofar as it imposes a discriminatory franchising requirement," id., at 142, 965 F. 2d, at 1104.4 The court declared the franchise requirement void to the extent it covers respondents and similarly situated SMATV operators. Id., at 144, 965 F. 2d, at 1106.5

Because the Court of Appeals held an Act of Congress unconstitutional, we granted certiorari. 506 U. S. 997 (1992). We now reverse.

II

Whether embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment or inferred from the Fifth, equal protection is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices. In areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification. See Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U. S. 478, 485 (1990); Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U. S. 587, 600-603 (1987); United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U. S. 166, 174-179 (1980); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 484-485 (1970). Where there are "plausible reasons" for

4 Chief Judge Mikva dissented for the reasons given in his earlier concurrence. 296 U. S. App. D. C., at 144, 965 F. 2d, at 1106.

5 The Court of Appeals had also questioned whether there existed a rational basis for distinguishing facilities connecting separately owned buildings by wire from those that do not connect separate buildings or that do so only by wireless media, such as radio or microwave transmission. See 294 U. S. App. D. C., at 382, 389, 959 F. 2d, at 980, 987. In its second opinion, however, the court found it unnecessary to consider that question, see 296 U. S. App. D. C., at 143, 965 F. 2d, at 1105, and it is not presented here.

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