Cite as: 508 U. S. 439 (1993)
Opinion of the Court
section 92, despite the Court of Appeals's conclusion to the contrary.11
Section 92 remains in force, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed. These cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
11 Because we conclude that the meaning of the 1916 Act is plain, and because respondents do not argue that the law's plain meaning is "demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters," Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U. S. 564, 571 (1982), we need not consider the 1916 Act's legislative history. Nor need we consider, again because the statute's meaning is unambiguous, what if any weight to accord the longstanding assumption of both the Comptroller and the Federal Reserve Board that section 92 survived the 1918 amendment of Rev. Stat. § 5202. See Public Employees Retirement System of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U. S. 158, 171 (1989).
We note finally, since respondents raise the point, that our remark in Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U. S. 497, 502 (1936), that the 1916 Act "amends [sections of the Federal Reserve Act], and § 5202 of the Revised Statutes" is obviously not controlling, coming as it did in an opinion that did not present the question we decide in these cases. Were we to consider our past remarks about the statutes we discuss here, we would also have to account for Commissioner v. First Security Bank of Utah, N. A., 405 U. S., at 401-402, and n. 12, in which the Court treated section 92 as valid law, despite noting its absence from the United States Code. Neither case tells us anything helpful for resolving this one, though together they contain a valuable reminder about the need to distinguish an opinion's holding from its dicta.
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