Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S. 464, 8 (1993)

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Cite as: 508 U. S. 464 (1993)

Opinion of the Court

. . . § 506(b) is inapplicable in the context of [Chapter 13] mortgage cures.' " Brief for Petitioners 13 (quoting Hall, supra, at 1154).

Petitioners' interpretation of §§ 506(b) and 1322(b)(5) does not comport with the terms of those provisions. Under § 506(b) the holder of an oversecured claim is allowed interest on his claim to the extent of the value of the collateral. Section 506(b) "directs that postpetition interest be paid on all oversecured claims," Ron Pair, 489 U. S., at 245 (emphasis added), and, as the parties acknowledge, such interest accrues as part of the allowed claim from the petition date until the confirmation or effective date of the plan. See supra, at 468. The arrearages owed on the mortgages held by respondent are plainly part of respondent's oversecured claims. Under the unqualified terms of § 506(b), therefore, respondent is entitled to preconfirmation interest on these arrear-ages. Where the statutory language is clear, our " 'sole function . . . is to enforce it according to its terms.' " Ron Pair, supra, at 241 (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470, 485 (1917)). Accord, Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 253-254 (1992).

Section 1322(b)(5), on the other hand, states that a Chapter 13 plan may "provide for the curing of any default and the maintenance of payments" on certain claims. While § 1322(b)(5) authorizes a Chapter 13 plan to provide for payments on arrearages to effectuate a cure after the effective date of the plan, nothing in that provision dictates the terms of the cure. In particular, § 1322(b)(5) provides no indication that the allowed amount of the arrearages cured under the plan may not include interest otherwise available as part of the oversecured claim under § 506(b). We generally avoid construing one provision in a statute so as to suspend or supersede another provision. To avoid "deny[ing] effect to a part of a statute," we accord " 'significance and effect . . . to every word.' " Ex parte Public Nat. Bank of New York, 278 U. S. 101, 104 (1928) (quoting Market Co. v. Hoffman, 101

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