510
Kennedy, J., dissenting
ing any issue of severability—is a question of state law to be addressed upon remand. Cf. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U. S. 7, 17-18 (1975) (invalidating state statute specifying greater age of majority for males than for females and remanding to state court to determine age of majority applicable to both groups under state law).
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Kennedy, with whom Justice Scalia, Justice Souter, and Justice Thomas join, dissenting.
With respect and full recognition that the statutory question the majority considers with care is difficult, I dissent from the opinion and judgment of the Court.
We consider two conflicting statutes, both attempting to establish priority for claims of the United States in proceedings to liquidate an insolvent insurance company. The first is the federal priority statute, 31 U. S. C. § 3713, which requires a debtor's obligations to the United States to be given first priority in insolvency proceedings. The second, Ohio's insurance company liquidation statute, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3903.42 (1989), provides that claims of the Federal Government are to be given fifth priority in proceedings to liquidate an insolvent insurer. Under usual principles of pre-emption, the federal priority statute trumps the inconsistent state law. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U. S. 132, 142-143 (1963). The question is whether the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which provides an exemption from pre-emption for certain state laws "enacted . . . for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance," 59 Stat. 34, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1012(b), alters this result.
Relying primarily on our decision in SEC v. National
Securities, Inc., 393 U. S. 453 (1969), the majority concludes
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