Cite as: 508 U. S. 520 (1993)
Opinion of Souter, J.
the concepts of neutrality and general applicability by indicating, in language hard to read as not foreclosing the Smith rule, that the Free Exercise Clause embraces more than mere formal neutrality, and that formal neutrality and general applicability are not sufficient conditions for free-exercise constitutionality:
"In a variety of ways we have said that '[a] regulation neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion.' " Thomas, 450 U. S., at 717 (quoting Yoder, supra, at 220). "[T]o agree that religiously grounded conduct must often be subject to the broad police power of the State is not to deny that there are areas of conduct protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and thus beyond the power of the State to control, even under regulations of general applicability." 450 U. S., at 717.
Not long before the Smith decision, indeed, the Court specifically rejected the argument that "neutral and uniform" requirements for governmental benefits need satisfy only a reasonableness standard, in part because "[s]uch a test has no basis in precedent." Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U. S. 136, 141 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, we have said, "[o]ur cases have established that '[t]he free exercise inquiry asks whether government has placed a substantial burden on the observation of a central religious belief or practice and, if so, whether a compelling governmental interest justifies the burden.' " Swaggart Ministries, 493 U. S., at 384-385 (quoting Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U. S. 680, 699 (1989)).
Thus we have applied the same rigorous scrutiny to burdens on religious exercise resulting from the enforcement of formally neutral, generally applicable laws as we have applied to burdens caused by laws that single out religious ex-
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