598
Stevens, J., concurring in judgment
The proposition that § 302(c)(5)'s specific statutory standards are enforceable on a continuing basis has never been questioned before today, by this Court or by any court of appeals. It is true, as the majority notes, ante, at 587, that the precise scope of the civil remedy authorized by § 302(e) has been the subject of controversy. Some courts have read § 302(e) quite broadly to authorize relief in cases of "unreasonable" or "arbitrary and capricious" trust administration. See, e. g., Phillips v. Alaska Hotel and Restaurant Employees Pension Fund, 944 F. 2d 509, 515 (CA9 1991); Stinson v. Ironworkers District Council of Southern Ohio and Vicinity Benefit Trust, 869 F. 2d, at 1019.4 Others have read § 302(e) more narrowly, as limited to remedying "violations of basic structure, as determined by the Congress, not violations of fiduciary obligations or standards of prudence in the administration of the trust fund." Bowers v. Ulpiano Casal, Inc., 393 F. 2d 421, 424 (CA1 1968). For present purdiately after deposit into a legitimate trust fund, they are diverted for some improper purpose.
More important, however, is the fact that other provisions of § 302(c)(5) clearly set forth standards for the continuing administration of trust funds. By their very terms, these standards demand compliance on an ongoing basis. See § 302(c)(5)(B) (employees and employers must be equally represented in fund administration); § 302(c)(5)(C) (payments to be used for pensions or annuities must be made to a separate trust). The obvious purpose of § 302(e)—a subsection largely overlooked by the majority—is to provide a vehicle for enforcing § 302(c)(5)'s ongoing obligations, among them the requirement that funds be held in trust for the benefit of employees.
4 As the majority notes, petitioners argue that § 302(c)(5) does not authorize such broad jurisdiction to "restructure and regulate employee benefit plans." See ante, at 588, n. 2. More precisely, the position with which respondents take issue in the cited pages of their brief, see ibid., is that "a collectively bargained term of an employee benefit plan is not subject to federal court review for reasonableness under Section 302 of LMRA." Brief for Petitioners 19; see Brief for Respondents 18. It is disingenuous, to say the least, to characterize petitioners' argument as one "attacking the basic authority of federal courts to regulate § 302(c)(5) trust funds." Ante, at 588, n. 2. See n. 6, infra.
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