Concrete Pipe & Products of Cal., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 30 (1993)

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Cite as: 508 U. S. 602 (1993)

Opinion of the Court

ees' demand, and the parties entered into a factual stipulation in the District Court prior to commencing the arbitration. Because of these two circumstances, there were virtually no contested factual determinations to which the arbitrator might have deferred. And, on the one question of fact that may have been disputed, the arbitrator found, apparently in the first instance, that Concrete Pipe's intent in closing the Shafter plant had been to cease operations permanently. App. 213-214.18

While we express no opinion on whether the facts in this case constitute a "complete withdrawal" within the meaning of the statute, a question not before us today, the approach taken by the arbitrator and the courts below is not inconsistent with our interpretation of the first presumption. The determination of the date of withdrawal by the arbitrator did not involve a misapplication of the statutory presumption, and it did not deprive Concrete Pipe of its right to procedural due process.

2

The second presumption at issue attends the calculation of the amount of withdrawal liability. The statute provides that in the absence of more particular PBGC regulations, the plan is required to use "actuarial assumptions and methods which, in the aggregate, are reasonable (taking into account the experience of the plan and reasonable expectations) and which, in combination, offer the actuary's best estimate of anticipated experience under the plan." 29 U. S. C. § 1393(a)(1). The presumption in question arises under § 1401(a)(3)(B), which provides that

18 Despite this favorable finding, Concrete Pipe still lost, of course. The arbitrator treated subjective intent as irrelevant. See App. 213-215. While the District Court and the Court of Appeals, which relied on the District Court's reasoning, did not go so far, see id., at 419-420, any factual deference in their decisions would be to the arbitrator's finding, itself untainted by the force of any presumption. See 29 U. S. C. § 1401(c); Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 52(a).

631

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