Cite as: 508 U. S. 602 (1993)
Opinion of Thomas, J.
concepts (as the Court intimates, see ante, at 622-625). The Court's reading leads to the conclusion that § 1401(a)(3)(A) is "meaningless," ante, at 625, because the statute (as so interpreted) "defines the nature of the conclusion the arbitrator must draw by using a combination of terms that are categorically ill-matched," ante, at 624.*
The Court's preoccupation with standards of review is understandable, at least with respect to "clearly erroneous," a term with an established legal usage. See Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U. S. 564, 573-575 (1985); Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 52(a). But such a reading is not compelled. As used in this statutory provision, "unreasonable" and "clearly erroneous" cannot signify standards applicable to the review of prior findings, since the arbitrator himself is undeniably a factfinder, not an appellate tribunal. See § 1401(c) (establishing a presumption of correctness for "the findings of fact made by the arbitrator"). That the arbitrator is to undertake his examination "by a preponderance of the evidence" explicitly establishes his role as factfinder; appellate review
*Regrettably, the Court compounds and further muddles the textual difficulty by suggesting that in some sense, "preponderance of the evidence," "unreasonable," and "clearly erroneous" are comparable—that they all refer to relative "degree[s] of certainty." Ante, at 622. There is, in fact, no basis for comparing any particular standard of proof with any particular standard of review. An appellate tribunal could be required to determine whether it was "clearly erroneous" to find a disputed fact "by a preponderance of the evidence," or it could ask whether any "reasonable" factfinder could have found "probable cause" to believe, or "clear and convincing evidence" supporting, the fact in question. See, e. g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U. S. 242, 252 (1986) ("If the defendant in a . . . civil case moves for summary judgment or for a directed verdict . . . , [the inquiry is] whether reasonable jurors could find by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict") (emphasis added); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 318-319 (1979) ("[T]he critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction . . . is whether [a] rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt") (emphasis added). Any combination of evidentiary and review standards is possible.
651
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