Harper v. Virginia Dept. of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 35 (1993)

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134

HARPER v. VIRGINIA DEPT. OF TAXATION

O'Connor, J., dissenting

tary relief. In Justice Stevens' view, however, Chevron Oil determined the question of remedy rather than which law would apply, new or old. See 496 U. S., at 220 (Chevron Oil and its progeny "establish a remedial principle for the exercise of equitable discretion by federal courts and not, as the plurality states, a choice-of-law principle applicable to all cases on direct review"); see also ante, at 95, n. 9 (reserving the possibility that Chevron Oil governs the question of remedies in federal court). If Justice Stevens' view or something like it has prevailed today—and it seems that it has—then state and federal courts still retain the ability to exercise their "equitable discretion" in formulating appropriate relief on a federal claim. After all, it would be wholly anomalous to suggest that federal courts are permitted to determine the scope of the remedy by reference to Chevron Oil, but that state courts are barred from considering the equities altogether. Not only would that unduly restrict state court "flexibility in the law of remedies," Estate of Donnelly, supra, at 297 (Harlan, J., concurring), but it also would turn federalism on its head. I know of no principle of law that permits us to restrict the remedial discretion of state courts without imposing similar restrictions on federal courts. Quite the opposite should be true, as the question of remedies in state court is generally a question of state law in the first instance. James B. Beam, 501 U. S., at 535 (Souter, J.).

The Court cites only a single case that might be read as precluding courts from considering the equities when selecting the remedy for the violation of a novel constitutional rule. That case is McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, supra. Ante, at 101-102. But, as the controlling opinion in James B. Beam explains, McKesson cannot be so read. 501 U. S., at 544 ("Nothing we say here [precludes the right] to raise procedural bars to recovery under state law or demonstrate reliance interests entitled to consideration in determining the nature of the remedy that must be provided, a matter with which McKes-

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