Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 22 (1993)

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230

BROOKE GROUP LTD. v. BROWN & WILLIAMSON TOBACCO CORP.

Opinion of the Court

tion it portends, may be the injury to competition the Act prohibits. See, e. g., United States v. Philadelphia Nat. Bank, 374 U. S. 321 (1963). We adhere to "the normal rule of statutory construction that identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning." Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U. S. 478, 484 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U. S. 557, 562 (1981) (evaluating the competitive injury requirement of Robinson-Patman Act § 2(a) in light of analogous interpretations of Clayton Act § 7). We decline to create a per se rule of nonli-ability for predatory price discrimination when recoupment is alleged to take place through supracompetitive oligopoly pricing. Cf. Cargill, 479 U. S., at 121.

III

Although Liggett's theory of liability, as an abstract matter, is within the reach of the statute, we agree with the Court of Appeals and the District Court that Liggett was not entitled to submit its case to the jury. It is not customary for this Court to review the sufficiency of the evidence, but we will do so when the issue is properly before us and the benefits of providing guidance concerning the proper application of a legal standard and avoiding the systemic costs associated with further proceedings justify the required expenditure of judicial resources. See, e. g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U. S. 585, 605-611 (1985); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U. S. 752, 765-768 (1984); United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U. S. 546, 550-552 (1966). The record in this case demonstrates that the anticompetitive scheme Liggett alleged, when judged against the realities of the market, does not provide an adequate basis for a finding of liability.

A

Liggett's theory of competitive injury through oligopolistic price coordination depends upon a complex chain of cause

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