Cite as: 509 U. S. 25 (1993)
Thomas, J., dissenting
prison authorities are ignoring the possible dangers posed by exposure to ETS. Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. The inquiry into this factor also would be an appropriate vehicle to consider arguments regarding the realities of prison administration.
V
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Scalia joins, dissenting.
Last Term, in Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U. S. 1 (1992), the Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the use of force that causes a prisoner only minor injuries. Believing that the Court had expanded the Eighth Amendment "beyond all bounds of history and precedent," id., at 28, I dissented. Today the Court expands the Eighth Amendment in yet another direction, holding that it applies to a prisoner's mere risk of injury. Because I find this holding no more acceptable than the Court's holding in Hudson, I again dissent.
I
The Eighth Amendment provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." The Court holds that a prisoner states a cause of action under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause by alleging that prison officials, with deliberate indifference, have exposed him to an unreasonable risk of harm. This decision, like every other "conditions of confinement" case since Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97 (1976), rests on the premise that deprivations suffered by a prisoner constitute "punishmen[t]" for Eighth Amendment purposes, even when the deprivations have not been inflicted as part of a criminal sentence. As I suggested in Hudson,
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