402
Opinion of Kennedy, J.
tion that when a defendant seeks to waive his right to counsel, a determination that he is competent to stand trial is not enough; the waiver must also be intelligent and voluntary before it can be accepted.14
III
Requiring that a criminal defendant be competent has a modest aim: It seeks to ensure that he has the capacity to understand the proceedings and to assist counsel. While psychiatrists and scholars may find it useful to classify the various kinds and degrees of competence, and while States are free to adopt competency standards that are more elaborate than the Dusky formulation, the Due Process Clause does not impose these additional requirements. Cf. Medina v. California, 505 U. S. 437, 446-453 (1992). The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
Justice Kennedy, with whom Justice Scalia joins, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I am in full agreement with the Court's decision that the competency standard for pleading guilty and waiving the right to counsel is the same as the test of competency to stand trial. As I have some reservations about one part of the Court's opinion and take a somewhat different path to reach my conclusion, it is appropriate to make some further observations.
The Court compares the types of decisions made by one who goes to trial with the decisions required to plead guilty and waive the right to counsel. This comparison seems to suggest that there may have been a heightened standard of
14 In this case the trial court explicitly found both that respondent was competent and that his waivers were knowing and voluntary. See supra, at 392-393.
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