Cite as: 509 U. S. 389 (1993)
Blackmun, J., dissenting
his client's mental competency. Under those circumstances, this Court directed the lower court to conduct an inquiry as to whether the defendant possessed the "capacity to appreciate his position and make a rational choice with respect to continuing or abandoning further litigation or on the other hand whether he is suffering from a mental disease, disorder, or defect which may substantially affect his capacity in the premises." 384 U. S., at 314 (emphasis added). Certainly the competency required for a capital defendant to proceed without the advice of counsel at trial or in plea negotiations should be no less than the competency required for a capital defendant to proceed against the advice of counsel to withdraw a petition for certiorari. The standard applied by the Ninth Circuit in this case—the "reasoned choice" standard— closely approximates the "rational choice" standard set forth in Rees.3
Disregarding the plain language of Westbrook and Massey, the majority in effect overrules those cases sub silentio.4 From the constitutional right of self-representation established in Faretta v. California, 422 U. S. 806 (1975), the majority extrapolates that "a criminal defendant's ability to represent himself has no bearing upon his competence to choose
3 According to the majority, "there is no indication . . . that the phrase ['rational choice'] means something different from 'rational understanding.' " Ante, at 398, n. 9. What the majority fails to recognize is that, in the distinction between a defendant who possesses a "rational understanding" of the proceedings and one who is able to make a "rational choice," lies the difference between the capacity for passive and active involvement in the proceedings.
4 According to the majority, "Westbrook stands only for the unremarkable proposition" that a determination of competence to stand trial is not sufficient to waive the right to counsel; "the waiver must also be intelligent and voluntary before it can be accepted." Ante, at 401-402. But the majority's attempt to transform a case about the competency to waive counsel into a case about the voluntariness of a waiver needlessly complicates this area of the law. Perhaps competence to waive rights is incorporated into a voluntariness inquiry, but there is no necessary link between the two concepts.
415
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