440
Stevens, J., dissenting
No such interest is asserted in this case. With barely a whisper of analysis, the Court concludes that a State's interest in discouraging lottery participation by its citizens is surely "substantial"—a necessary prerequisite to sustain a restriction on commercial speech, see Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N. Y., 447 U. S. 557, 566 (1980)—because gambling "falls into a category of 'vice' activity that could be, and frequently has been, banned altogether," ante, at 426.
I disagree. While a State may indeed have an interest in discouraging its citizens from participating in state-run lotteries,5 it does not necessarily follow that its interest is "substantial" enough to justify an infringement on constitutionally protected speech,6 especially one as draconian as the regulation at issue in this case. In my view, the sea change in public attitudes toward state-run lotteries that this country has witnessed in recent years undermines any claim that a State's interest in discouraging its citizens from participating in state-run lotteries is so substantial as to outweigh respondent's First Amendment right to distribute, and the public's right to receive, truthful, nonmisleading information about a perfectly legal activity conducted in a neighboring State.
While the Court begins its opinion with a discussion of the federal and state efforts in the 19th century to restrict lotteries, it largely ignores the fact that today hostility to state-run lotteries is the exception rather than the norm.
5 A State might reasonably conclude, for example, that lotteries play on the hopes of those least able to afford to purchase lottery tickets, and that its citizens would be better served by spending their money on more promising investments. The fact that I happen to share these concerns regarding state-sponsored lotteries is, of course, irrelevant to the proper analysis of the legal issue.
6 See, e. g., Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U. S. 410, 417, n. 13 (1993) (noting that restrictions on commercial speech are subject to more searching scrutiny than mere "rational basis" review).
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