Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 24 (1993)

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Cite as: 509 U. S. 544 (1993)

Kennedy, J., dissenting

they break the law than to throttle them and all others beforehand." 420 U. S., at 559.

It has been suggested that the distinction between prior restraints and subsequent punishments may have slight utility, see Nimmer, supra, § 4.04, at 4-18 to 4-25, for in a certain sense every criminal obscenity statute is a prior restraint because of the caution a speaker or bookseller must exercise to avoid its imposition. See Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U. S. 308, 324 (1980) (White, J., joined by Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Jeffries, Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 Yale L. J. 409, 437 (1982). To be sure, the term "prior restraint" is not self-defining. One problem, of course, is that some governmental actions may have the characteristics both of punishment and prior restraint. A historical example is the sentence imposed on Hugh Singleton in 1579 after he had enraged Elizabeth I by printing a certain tract. See F. Siebert, Freedom of the Press in England, 1476-1776, pp. 91-92 (1952). Singleton was condemned to lose his right hand, thus visiting upon him both a punishment and a disability encumbering all further printing. Though the sentence appears not to have been carried out, it illustrates that a prior restraint and a subsequent punishment may occur together. Despite the concurrent operation of the two kinds of prohibitions in some cases, the distinction between them persists in our law, and it is instructive here to inquire why this is so.

Early in our legal tradition the source of the distinction was the English common law, in particular the oft cited passage from William Blackstone's 18th-century Commentaries on the Laws of England. He observed as follows:

"The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state; but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published. Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public: to forbid this, is to

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