Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 26 (1993)

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Cite as: 509 U. S. 602 (1993)

Opinion of Scalia, J.

in Part III dictum. Statutory forfeitures under § 881(a) are certainly payment (in kind) to a sovereign as punishment for an offense.

II

That this forfeiture works as a fine raises the excessiveness issue, on which the Court remands. I agree that a remand is in order, but think it worth pointing out that on remand the excessiveness analysis must be different from that applicable to monetary fines and, perhaps, to in personam forfeitures. In the case of a monetary fine, the Eighth Amendment's origins in the English Bill of Rights, intended to limit the abusive penalties assessed against the King's opponents, see Browning-Ferris, 492 U. S., at 266-267, demonstrate that the touchstone is value of the fine in relation to the offense. And in Alexander v. United States, we indicated that the same is true for in personam forfeiture. Ante, at 558.

Here, however, the offense of which petitioner has been convicted is not relevant to the forfeiture. Section § 881 requires only that the Government show probable cause that the subject property was used for the prohibited purpose. The burden then shifts to the property owner to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the use was made without his "knowledge, consent, or willful blindness," 21 U. S. C. § 881(a)(4)(C), see also § 881(a)(7), or that the property was not so used, see § 881(d) (incorporating 19 U. S. C. § 1615). Unlike monetary fines, statutory in rem forfeitures have traditionally been fixed, not by determining the appropriate value of the penalty in relation to the committed offense, but by determining what property has been "tainted" by unlawful use, to which issue the value of the property is irrelevant. Scales used to measure out unlawful drug sales, for example, are confiscable whether made of the purest gold or the basest metal. But an in rem forfeiture goes beyond the traditional limits that the Eighth Amendment permits if it applies to property that cannot properly be regarded as an instrumen-

627

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