Cite as: 509 U. S. 630 (1993)
White, J., dissenting
the question in gerrymandering cases is "whether a particular group has been unconstitutionally denied its chance to effectively influence the political process," id., at 132-133. Thus, "an equal protection violation may be found only where the electoral system substantially disadvantages certain voters in their opportunity to influence the political process effectively." Id., at 133 (emphasis added). By this, I meant that the group must exhibit "strong indicia of lack of political power and the denial of fair representation," so that it could be said that it has "essentially been shut out of the political process." Id., at 139. In short, even assuming that racial (or political) factors were considered in the drawing of district boundaries, a showing of discriminatory effects is a "threshold requirement" in the absence of which there is no equal protection violation, id., at 143, and no need to "reach the question of the state interests . . . served by the particular districts," id., at 142.4
To distinguish a claim that alleges that the redistricting scheme has discriminatory intent and effect from one that does not has nothing to do with dividing racial classifications between the "benign" and the malicious—an enterprise which, as the majority notes, the Court has treated with skepticism. See ante, at 642-643. Rather, the issue is whether the classification based on race discriminates
4 Although disagreeing with the Court's holding in Davis that claims of political gerrymandering are justiciable, see id., at 144 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment), the author of today's opinion expressed views on racial gerrymandering quite similar to my own: "[W]here a racial minority group is characterized by 'the traditional indicia of suspectness' and is vulnerable to exclusion from the political process . . . individual voters who belong to that group enjoy some measure of protection against intentional dilution of their group voting strength by means of racial gerrymandering. . . . Even so, the individual's right is infringed only if the racial minority can prove that it has 'essentially been shut out of the political process.'" Id., at 151-152 (emphasis added). As explained below, that position cannot be squared with the one taken by the majority in this case.
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