Cite as: 509 U. S. 688 (1993)
Opinion of Scalia, J.
Foster's attorney, who prosecuted the contempt, would have to prove, first, knowledge of a CPO, and, second, a willful violation of one of its conditions, here simple assault as defined by the criminal code.5 See, e. g., 598 A. 2d, at 727-728; In re Thompson, 454 A. 2d 1324, 1326 (D. C. 1982); accord, Parker v. United States, 373 A. 2d 906, 907 (D. C. 1977) (per curiam). On the basis of the same episode, Foster was then indicted for violation of § 22-501, which proscribes assault with intent to kill. Under governing law, that offense requires proof of specific intent to kill; simple assault does not.6 See Logan v. United States, 483 A. 2d 664, 672-673 (D. C. 1984). Similarly, the contempt offense required proof of knowledge of the CPO, which assault with intent to kill does not. Applying the Blockburger elements test, the result is clear: These crimes were different offenses, and the sub-5 Given this requirement of willful violation of the order, Justice White's desire to "put to the side the CPO," because it only "triggered the court's authority" cannot be reconciled with his desire to "compar[e] the substantive offenses of which respondents stood accused." Post, at 734. The "substantive offense" of criminal contempt is willful violation of a court order. Far from a mere jurisdictional device, that order (or CPO) is the centerpiece of the entire proceeding. Its terms define the prohibited conduct, its existence supports imposition of a criminal penalty, and willful violation of it is necessary for conviction. To ignore the CPO when determining whether two offenses are the "same" is no more possible than putting aside the statutory definitions of criminal offenses. Of course, Justice White's view that the elements of criminal contempt are essentially irrelevant for double jeopardy analysis does have precedent— albeit erroneous—in Grady's same-conduct test. Grady v. Corbin, 495 U. S. 508 (1990). Justice Souter also ignores the knowledge element. Post, at 761, n. 10.
6 We accept, as we ordinarily do, the construction of a District of Columbia law adopted by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. See, e. g., Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U. S. 363, 368-369 (1974). The construction here has sound support in the text of the statute. Compare D. C. Code Ann. § 22-501 (1989) (assault with intent to kill, rob, rape, or poison) with § 22-504 (assault).
701
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