Cite as: 509 U. S. 688 (1993)
Opinion of White, J.
tution. We see no sound reason in logic or policy not to apply it in the area of criminal contempt." Id., at 209.4
Dixon aptly illustrates these points. In that case, the motion requesting modification of the conditions of Dixon's release was filed by the Government, the same entity responsible for prosecution of the drug offense. Indeed, in so doing it relied explicitly on the defendant's indictment on the cocaine charge. 598 A. 2d 724, 728 (D. C. 1991). Logically, any problem of coordination or of advance notice of the impending prosecution for the substantive offense was at most minimal. Nor, aside from the legitimate desire to punish all offenders swiftly, does there appear to have been any real need to hold Dixon in contempt immediately, without waiting for the second trial. By way of comparison, at the time of his drug offense Dixon was awaiting trial for second-degree murder, a charge that had been brought some 11 months earlier.
Besides, in the situation where a person has violated a condition of release, there generally exist a number of alternatives under which the defendant's right against being put twice in jeopardy for the same offense could be safeguarded, while ensuring that disregard of the court's authority not go unsanctioned. To the extent that they are exercised with due regard for the Constitution, such options might include modification of release conditions or revocation of bail and detention.5 As respondents acknowledge, these solutions
4 Like Justice Scalia, I take no position as to the application of the Double Jeopardy Clause to conduct warranting summary contempt proceedings. See ante, at 697, n. 1. In different circumstances, the Court has recognized exceptions to the policy of avoiding multiple trials where " 'there is a manifest necessity.' " United States v. Wilson, 420 U. S. 332, 344 (1975) (quoting United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579, 580 (1824)).
5 The laws of different jurisdictions make such alternatives more or less available but that, of course, can have no bearing on the constitutional requirements we recognize today. In the District of Columbia, D. C. Code Ann. § 23-1329 (1989) contemplates both revocation of release and an order of detention in the event a condition of release has been violated. Also,
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