742
Opinion of Blackmun, J.
Clause could bar the subsequent prosecution. But we are concerned here with contempt of court, a special situation. We explained in Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S. A., 481 U. S. 787 (1987):
"The fact that we have come to regard criminal contempt as 'a crime in the ordinary sense,' [Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 194, 201 (1968)], does not mean that any prosecution of contempt must now be considered an execution of the criminal law in which only the Executive Branch may engage. . . . That criminal procedure protections are now required in such prosecutions should not obscure the fact that these proceedings are not intended to punish conduct proscribed as harmful by the general criminal laws. Rather, they are designed to serve the limited purpose of vindicating the authority of the court. In punishing contempt, the Judiciary is sanctioning conduct that violates specific duties imposed by the court itself, arising directly from the parties' participation in judicial proceedings." Id., at 799-800.
The purpose of contempt is not to punish an offense against the community at large but rather to punish the specific offense of disobeying a court order. This Court said nearly a century ago: "[A] court, enforcing obedience to its orders by proceedings for contempt, is not executing the criminal laws of the land, but only securing to suitors the rights which it has adjudged them entitled to." In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564, 596 (1895).
II
Contempt is one of the very few mechanisms available to a trial court to vindicate the authority of its orders. I fear that the Court's willingness to overlook the unique interests served by contempt proceedings not only will jeopardize the ability of trial courts to control those defendants under their supervision but will undermine their ability to respond effec-
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