Cite as: 509 U. S. 43 (1993)
O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment
Respondents assert that equity requires an extension of the time limit imposed by § 1255a(a)(1)(A). Whether that provision is seen as a limitations period subject to equitable tolling, see Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89, 95-96 (1990), or as a substantive requirement subject perhaps to equitable estoppel, see Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, 496 U. S. 414, 419-424 (1990), the District Courts needed some special reason to exercise that equitable power against the United States. The only reason respondents adduce is supposed "affirmative misconduct" by the INS. See Irwin, supra, at 96 ("We have allowed equitable tolling in situations . . . where the complainant has been induced or tricked by his adversary's misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass"); Richmond, supra, at 421 ("Our own opinions have continued to mention the possibility, in the course of rejecting estoppel arguments, that some type of 'affirmative misconduct' might give rise to estoppel against the Government"). Respondents argue that the INS engaged in "affirmative misconduct" by promulgating the invalid regulations, which deterred aliens who were ineligible under those regulations from applying for legalization. See Plaintiffs' Submission Re Availability of Remedies for the Plaintiff Class in CSS, pp. 6-15 (Record, Doc. No. 164), Plaintiffs' Memorandum on Remedies in LULAC (Record, Doc. No. 40). The District Courts essentially accepted the argument, ordering remedies coextensive with the INS' supposed "misconduct." The CSS court extended the application period for those class members who "knew of [the INS'] unlawful regulation and thereby concluded that they were ineligible for legalization and by reason of that conclusion did not file an application," App. to Pet. for Cert. 25a; the LULAC court provided an almost identical remedy, see id., at 59a.
I cannot agree that a benefit-conferring agency commits "affirmative misconduct," sufficient to justify an equitable extension of the statutory time period for application, simply
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