John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust and Sav. Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 13 (1993)

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112

JOHN HANCOCK MUT. LIFE INS. CO. v.

HARRIS TRUST AND SAV. BANK Thomas, J., dissenting

assumption that Congress "says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there," Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 254 (1992). Unlike the Court, I see no need to base an understanding of § 401(b)(2) on principles derived from the interpretation of dissimilar provisions in the Securities Act of 1933, see ante, at 101-104, or from a sense of the policy of ERISA as a whole, see ante, at 96. The meaning of the provision can be determined readily by examining its component terms.

First, the insurance contract must "provide for" guaranteed benefits. Because "provides for" is not defined by the statute, we should give the phrase its ordinary or natural meaning. See Smith v. United States, 508 U. S. 223, 228 (1993). Looking at the contract, the Court observes that there is "no genuine guarantee of the amount of benefits that plan participants will receive in the future." Ante, at 105. The Court apparently takes "provides for" to mean that the contract must currently guarantee the amounts to be disbursed in future payments. That is not, however, what "provides for" means in ordinary speech.

When applied to a document such as a contract, "provides for" is "most natural[ly]" read and is "commonly understood" to mean " 'make a provision for.' " Rake v. Wade, 508 U. S. 464, 473, 474 (1993) (interpreting a section of the Bankruptcy Code that applies to " 'each allowed secured claim provided for by the [reorganization] plan' ") (emphasis added). See also Black's Law Dictionary 1224 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "provide" as "[t]o make, procure, or furnish for future use, prepare"). If "provides for" is construed in this way, the insurance contract need not guarantee the benefits for any particular plan participant until the benefits have vested, so long as it makes provision for the payment of guaranteed benefits in the future. See Mack Boring & Parts v. Meeker Sharkey Moffitt, Actuarial Consultants, 930 F. 2d 267, 273 (CA3 1991) ("Section 401(b)(2)(B) does not, on its face, require that the benefits contracted for be delivered immedi-

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