Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 2 (1994)

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164

WEISS v. UNITED STATES

Syllabus

force require a second appointment. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, and subsequent decisions simply do not speak to this question. The present case is also distinguishable from Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U. S. 282. Even assuming, arguendo, that the "germaneness" principle set forth in Shoemaker, id., at 300-301, applies to the present situation, no second appointment is necessary because the role of military judge is "germane" to that of military officer: By contrast to civilian society, non-judicial military officers play a significant part in the administration of military justice; and, by the same token, the position of military judge is less distinct from other military positions than the office of full-time civilian judge is from other offices in civilian society. Pp. 169-176. 2. The lack of a fixed term of office for military judges does not violate the Due Process Clause. Neither Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, nor Medina v. California, 505 U. S. 437, provides a due process analysis that is appropriate to the military context, in which judicial deference to Congress' determinations is at its apogee. Rather, the appropriate standard is that found in Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U. S. 25, 44: whether the factors militating in favor of fixed terms are so extraordinarily weighty as to overcome the balance struck by Congress. The historical fact that military judges in the Anglo-American system have never had tenure is a factor that must be weighed in this calculation. Moreover, the applicable provisions of the UCMJ, and corresponding regulations, sufficiently insulate military judges from the effects of command influence. Thus, since neither history nor current practice supports petitioners' assumption that a military judge who does not have a fixed term lacks the independence necessary to ensure impartiality, petitioners have fallen far short of satisfying the applicable standard. Pp. 176-181. 36 M. J. 224 and 37 M. J. 252, affirmed.

Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Black-mun, Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined, and in which Scalia and Thomas, JJ., joined as to Parts I and II-A. Souter, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 182. Ginsburg, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 194. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Thomas, J., joined, post, p. 195.

Alan B. Morrison argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Philip D. Cave, Dwight H. Sullivan, Eugene R. Fidell, and Ronald W. Meister.

Solicitor General Days argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Acting Assistant At-

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