Cite as: 510 U. S. 332 (1994)
Syllabus
general prohibition of rate discrimination. To consider such a tax "another tax" under subsection (b)(4) would subvert the statutory plan by reading subsection (b)(4) to prohibit what subsection (b)(3), in conjunction with subsection (a)(4), was designed to allow. The result would contravene the elementary canon of construction that a statute should be interpreted so as not to render one part inoperative. Pp. 338-341. (b) The phrase "subject to a property tax levy" further qualifies the subsection (a)(4) definition. When used elsewhere in § 11503, that phrase means property that is taxed; and since identical words used in different parts of the same Act are intended to have the same meaning, the phrase must carry the same meaning in subsection (a)(4), Sorenson v. Secretary of Treasury, 475 U. S. 851, 860. Thus, exempt property is not part of the comparison class. It would be illogical to conclude that Congress, having allowed States to grant property tax exemptions in subsections (b)(1)-(3), would turn around and nullify its own choice in subsection (b)(4). Pp. 341-343. (c) Other considerations reinforce the foregoing construction of the statute. Section 11503's silence on the subject of tax exemptions—in light of the explicit prohibition of tax rate and assessment ratio discrimination—reflects a determination to permit the States to leave their exemptions in place. Principles of federalism compel this view, for a statute is interpreted to pre-empt traditional state powers only if that result is the clear and manifest purpose of Congress. The statute's legislative history casts no doubt upon this interpretation. Nor does the interpretation lead to an anomalous result. Since railroads are not the only commercial entities subject to Oregon's tax, it need not be decided whether subsection (b)(4) would prohibit a tax that did single out railroad property. And since it is within Congress' sound discretion to weigh the benefit of preserving some exemptions against the benefit of protecting rail carriers from every tax scheme that favors some nonrail-road property, the result reached here is not so bizarre that Congress could not have intended it. See Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U. S. 184, 191. Pp. 343-348.
961 F. 2d 813, reversed and remanded.
Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Blackmun, O'Connor, Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 348.
Virginia L. Linder, Solicitor General of Oregon, argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs were Theodore R. Kulongoski, Attorney General, Thomas A. Balmer,
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