Cite as: 510 U. S. 443 (1994)
Opinion of the Court
sider whether Louisiana's rule "interferes with the proper harmony and uniformity" of maritime law, Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, supra, at 216.
In The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558, 575 (1875), Justice Bradley, writing for the Court, said of the Article III provision extending federal judicial power "to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction":
"One thing . . . is unquestionable; the Constitution must have referred to a system of law coextensive with, and operating uniformly in, the whole country. It certainly could not have been the intention to place the rules and limits of maritime law under the disposal and regulation of the several States, as that would have defeated the uniformity and consistency at which the Constitution aimed on all subjects of a commercial character affecting the intercourse of the States with each other or with foreign states."
By reason of this principle, we disallowed in Jensen the application of state workers' compensation statutes to injuries covered by the admiralty jurisdiction. Later, in Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149, 163-164 (1920), we held that not even Congress itself could permit such application and thereby sanction destruction of the constitutionally prescribed uniformity. We have also relied on the uniformity principle to hold that a State may not require that a maritime contract be in writing where admiralty law regards oral contracts as valid, Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U. S. 731 (1961).
The requirement of uniformity is not, however, absolute. As Jensen itself recognized: "[I]t would be difficult, if not impossible, to define with exactness just how far the general maritime law may be changed, modified, or affected by state legislation. That this may be done to some extent cannot be denied." 244 U. S., at 216. A later case describes to what breadth this "some extent" extends:
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