FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 14 (1994)

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484

FDIC v. MEYER

Opinion of the Court

ereign immunity. 944 F. 2d, at 572. The Ninth Circuit's reasoning conflates two "analytically distinct" inquiries. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U. S., at 218. The first inquiry is whether there has been a waiver of sovereign immunity. If there has been such a waiver, as in this case, the second inquiry comes into play—that is, whether the source of substantive law upon which the claimant relies provides an avenue for relief. Id., at 216-217. It is to this second inquiry that we now turn.

Meyer bases his due process claim on our decision in Bivens, which held that an individual injured by a federal agent's alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment may bring an action for damages against the agent. 403 U. S., at 397. In our most recent decisions, we have "responded cautiously to suggestions that Bivens remedies be extended into new contexts." Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U. S. 412, 421 (1988).9 In this case, Meyer seeks a significant extension of Bivens: He asks us to expand the category of defendants against whom Bivens-type actions may be brought to include not only federal agents, but federal agencies as well.

We know of no Court of Appeals decision, other than the Ninth Circuit's below, that has implied a Bivens-type cause of action directly against a federal agency. Meyer recognizes the absence of authority supporting his position, but argues that the "logic" of Bivens would support such a remedy. We disagree. In Bivens, the petitioner sued the agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics who allegedly violated his rights, not the Bureau itself. 403 U. S., at 389-390.

9 For example, a Bivens action alleging a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment may be appropriate in some contexts, but not in others. Compare Davis v. Passman, 442 U. S. 228, 248-249 (1979) (implying Bivens action under the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause in the context of alleged gender discrimination in employment), with Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U. S., at 429 (refusing to imply Bivens action for alleged due process violations in the denial of Social Security disability benefits on the ground that a damages remedy was not included in the elaborate remedial scheme devised by Congress).

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