United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 9 (1993)

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Cite as: 510 U. S. 43 (1993)

Opinion of the Court

designed to safeguard the rights of those accused of criminal conduct." Ibid. (emphasis in original).

So too, in Graham we held that claims of excessive force in the course of an arrest or investigatory stop should be evaluated under the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard, not under the "more generalized notion of 'substantive due process.' " 490 U. S., at 395. Because the degree of force used to effect a seizure is one determinant of its reasonableness, and because the Fourth Amendment guarantees citizens the right "to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable . . . seizures," we held that a claim of excessive force in the course of such a seizure is "most properly characterized as one invoking the protections of the Fourth Amendment." Id., at 394.

Neither Gerstein nor Graham, however, provides support for the proposition that the Fourth Amendment is the beginning and end of the constitutional inquiry whenever a seizure occurs. That proposition is inconsistent with the approach we took in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U. S. 663 (1974), which examined the constitutionality of ex parte seizures of forfeitable property under general principles of due process, rather than the Fourth Amendment. And it is at odds with our reliance on the Due Process Clause to analyze prejudgment seizure and sequestration of personal property. See, e. g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67 (1972); Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U. S. 600 (1974).

It is true, of course, that the Fourth Amendment applies to searches and seizures in the civil context and may serve to resolve the legality of these governmental actions without reference to other constitutional provisions. See Camara v. Municipal Court of City and County of San Francisco, 387 U. S. 523 (1967) (holding that a warrant based on probable cause is required for administrative search of residences for safety inspections); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 489 U. S. 602 (1989) (holding that federal regulations authorizing railroads to conduct blood and urine tests of cer-

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