Cite as: 510 U. S. 517 (1994)
Opinion of the Court
or brought in bad faith.6 In contrast, some Courts of Appeals follow the so-called "evenhanded" approach in which no distinction is made between prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants.7 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, for example, has ruled that "we do not require bad faith, nor do we mandate an allowance of fees as a concomitant of prevailing in every case, but we do favor an evenhanded approach." Lieb v. Topstone Industries, Inc., 788 F. 2d 151, 156 (1986).
We granted certiorari, 509 U. S. 903 (1993), to address
an important area of federal law and to resolve the conflict between the Ninth Circuit's "dual" standard for awarding attorney's fees under § 505, and the so-called "evenhanded" approach exemplified by the Third Circuit.8 We reverse.
6 By predicating an award of attorney's fees to prevailing defendants on a showing of bad faith or frivolousness on the part of plaintiffs, the "dual" standard makes it more difficult for prevailing defendants to secure awards of attorney's fees than prevailing plaintiffs. The Ninth Circuit has explained that prevailing plaintiffs, on the other hand, should generally receive such awards absent special circumstances such as "the presence of a complex or novel issue of law that the defendant litigates vigorously and in good faith . . . ." McCulloch v. Albert E. Price, Inc., 823 F. 2d 316, 323 (1987). In the instant case, the Court of Appeals explained: "The purpose of [the dual standard] rule is to avoid chilling a copyright holder's incentive to sue on colorable claims, and thereby to give full effect to the broad protection for copyrights intended by the Copyright Act." 984 F. 2d, at 1532.
7 At oral argument, counsel for respondent voiced his dissatisfaction with the terms "dual" and "evenhanded" used to describe the differing rules in the Circuits. Tr. of Oral Arg. 31. Counsel objected to the implication from the terms—that the Ninth Circuit's dual standard was somehow not evenhanded or fair. While this point may be well taken in a rhetorical sense, we will continue to use the terms as commonly used by the lower courts for the sake of convenience.
8 In addition to the Ninth Circuit, the Second, Seventh, and District of Columbia Circuits have adopted a "dual" standard of awarding attorney's fees whereby a greater burden is placed upon prevailing defendants than prevailing plaintiffs. See, e. g., Diamond v. Am-Law Publishing Corp.,
521
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