Cite as: 510 U. S. 517 (1994)
Thomas, J., concurring in judgment
one instance, but reject that same interpretation as "mechanical" and "untenable" in the other. After today's decision, Congress could employ the same terminology in two different attorney's fee statutes, but be quite uncertain as to whether the Court would adopt a "dual" standard (that is, reject the "mechanical" construction) or apply an "evenhanded" rule (that is, adopt the "plain meaning").
Such an inconsistent approach to statutory interpretation robs the law of "the clarity of its command and the certainty of its application." Doggett v. United States, 505 U. S. 647, 669 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Indeed, we repeatedly have sought to avoid this sort of inconsistency in our fee award decisions. See, e. g., Burlington v. Dague, 505 U. S. 557, 562 (1992) ("case law construing what is a 'reasonable' fee applies uniformly to all" fee-shifting statutes using the term); Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U. S. 680, 691 (1983) ("similar attorney's fee provisions should be interpreted pari passu"); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424, 433, n. 7 (1983) (the standards "set forth in this opinion are generally applicable in all cases in which Congress has authorized an award of fees to a 'prevailing party' "). See also Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U. S. 754, 758, n. 2 (1989) ("fee-shifting statutes' similar language is 'a strong indication' that they are to be interpreted alike"); Northcross v. Board of Ed. of Memphis City Schools, 412 U. S. 427, 428 (1973) (per curiam) ("[S]imilarity of language . . . is, of course, a strong indication that . . . two [attorney's fee] statutes should be interpreted pari passu").
The Court recognizes the general principle that similar fee provisions are to be interpreted alike, ante, at 523, but states that the principle does not govern this case because the factors that guided our interpretation in Christiansburg—the policy objectives and legislative history of the statute—do not support the adoption of a "dual" standard in this context. See ante, at 522-525. The Court's analysis, however, rests on the mistaken premise—a premise implicit in Christians-
537
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