Cite as: 510 U. S. 43 (1993)
Opinion of Thomas, J.
the critical facts of the case before it. As the opinions of The Chief Justice, ante, at 69-72, and Justice O'Connor, ante, at 74-76, persuasively demonstrate, the Court's opinion is predicated in large part upon misreadings of important civil forfeiture precedents, especially Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U. S. 663 (1974).3 I will not repeat the critiques found in the other dissents, but will add that it is twice puzzling for the majority to explain cases such as Springer v. United States, 102 U. S. 586 (1881), and Dobbins's Distillery, supra, as depending on the Federal Government's urgent need for revenue in the 19th century. First, it is somewhat odd that the Court suggests that the Government's financial concerns might justifiably control the due process analysis, see ante, at 59-60, and second, it is diffi-cult to believe that the prompt collection of funds was more essential to the Government a century ago than it is today.
I agree with the other dissenters that a fair application of the relevant precedents to this case would indicate that no due process violation occurred. But my concerns regarding the legitimacy of the current scope of the Government's real property forfeiture operations lead me to consider these cases as only helpful to the analysis, not dispositive. What convinces me that Good's due process rights were not violated are the facts of this case—facts that are disregarded by the Court in its well-intentioned effort to protect "innocent owners" from mistaken Government seizures. Ante, at 55. The Court forgets that "this case is an as applied challenge to the seizure of Good's property." Ante, at 77 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In holding that the Government generally may not seize real property prior to a final judgment of forfeiture, see ante, at 59, 62, the
3 With scant support, the Court also dispenses with the ancient jurisdictional rule that "a valid seizure of the res is a prerequisite to the initiation of an in rem civil forfeiture proceeding," Republic Nat. Bank of Miami v. United States, 506 U. S. 80, 84 (1992), at least in the case of real property. See ante, at 57-58.
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