Cite as: 511 U. S. 93 (1994)
Opinion of the Court
that it advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives." New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U. S. 269, 278 (1988). See also Chemical Waste, supra, at 342-343. Our cases require that justifications for discriminatory restrictions on commerce pass the "strictest scrutiny." Hughes, 441 U. S., at 337. The State's burden of justification is so heavy that "facial discrimination by itself may be a fatal defect." Ibid. See also Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 466 U. S. 388, 406-407 (1984); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U. S. 725, 759-760 (1981).
At the outset, we note two justifications that respondents
have not presented. No claim has been made that the disposal of waste from other States imposes higher costs on Oregon and its political subdivisions than the disposal of in-state waste.5 Also, respondents have not offered any safety or health reason unique to nonhazardous waste from other States for discouraging the flow of such waste into Oregon. Cf. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U. S. 131 (1986) (upholding ban on importation of out-of-state baitfish into Maine because such baitfish were subject to parasites completely foreign to Maine baitfish). Consequently, respondents must come forward with other legitimate reasons to subject waste from other States to a higher charge than is levied against waste from Oregon.
5 In fact, the Commission fixed the $2.25 per ton cost of disposing of solid waste in Oregon landfills without reference to the origin of the waste, 3 Record 665-690, and Oregon's economic consultant recognized that the per ton costs are the same for both in-state and out-of-state waste. Id., at 731-732, 744. Of course, if out-of-state waste did impose higher costs on Oregon than in-state waste, Oregon could recover the increased cost through a differential charge on out-of-state waste, for then there would be a "reason, apart from its origin, why solid waste coming from outside the [State] should be treated differently." Fort Gratiot Sanitary Land-fill, Inc. v. Michigan Dept. of Natural Resources, 504 U. S. 353, 361 (1992). Cf. Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U. S. 415, 417 (1952); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U. S. 385, 399 (1948).
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