144
Opinion of the Court
parties may exercise their peremptory challenges intelligently. See, e. g., Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U. S. 539, 602 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (voir dire "facilitate[s] intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges and [helps] uncover factors that would dictate disqualification for cause"); United States v. Witt, 718 F. 2d 1494, 1497 (CA10 1983) ("Without an adequate foundation [laid by voir dire], counsel cannot exercise sensitive and intelligent peremptory challenges").
The experience in the many jurisdictions that have barred gender-based challenges belies the claim that litigants and trial courts are incapable of complying with a rule barring strikes based on gender. See n. 1, supra (citing state and federal jurisdictions that have extended Batson to gender).17
As with race-based Batson claims, a party alleging gender discrimination must make a prima facie showing of inten-17 Respondent argues that Alabama's method of jury selection would make the extension of Batson to gender particularly burdensome. In Alabama, the "struck-jury" system is employed, a system which requires litigants to strike alternately until 12 persons remain, who then constitute the jury. See Ala. Rule Civ. Proc. 47 (1990). Respondent suggests that, in some cases at least, it is necessary under this system to continue striking persons from the venire after the litigants no longer have an articulable reason for doing so. As a result, respondent contends, some litigants may be unable to come up with gender-neutral explanations for their strikes.
We find it worthy of note that Alabama has managed to maintain its struck-jury system even after the ruling in Batson, despite the fact that there are counties in Alabama that are predominately African-American. In those counties, it presumably would be as difficult to come up with race-neutral explanations for peremptory strikes as it would be to advance gender-neutral explanations. No doubt the voir dire process aids litigants in their ability to articulate race-neutral explanations for their peremptory challenges. The same should be true for gender. Regardless, a State's choice of jury-selection methods cannot insulate it from the strictures of the Equal Protection Clause. Alabama is free to adopt whatever jury-selection procedures it chooses so long as they do not violate the Constitution.
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