Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 31 (1994)

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274

LANDGRAF v. USI FILM PRODUCTS

Opinion of the Court

we observed that "relief by injunction operates in futuro," and that the plaintiff had no "vested right" in the decree entered by the trial court. 257 U. S., at 201. See also, e. g., Hall v. Beals, 396 U. S. 45, 48 (1969); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 464 (1921).

We have regularly applied intervening statutes conferring or ousting jurisdiction, whether or not jurisdiction lay when the underlying conduct occurred or when the suit was filed. Thus, in Bruner v. United States, 343 U. S. 112, 116-117 (1952), relying on our "consisten[t]" practice, we ordered an action dismissed because the jurisdictional statute under which it had been (properly) filed was subsequently repealed.27 See also Hallowell v. Commons, 239 U. S. 506, 508-509 (1916); Assessors v. Osbornes, 9 Wall. 567, 575 (1870). Conversely, in Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Products Co., 436 U. S. 604, 607-608, n. 6 (1978), we held that, because a statute passed while the case was pending on appeal had eliminated the amount-in-controversy requirement for federal-question cases, the fact that respondent had failed to allege $10,000 in controversy at the commencement of the action was "now of no moment." See also United States v. Alabama, 362 U. S. 602, 604 (1960) (per curiam); Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U. S. 445, 478 (1899). Application of a new jurisdictional rule usually "takes away no substantive right but simply changes the tribunal that is to hear the case." Hallowell, 239 U. S., at 508. Present law normally governs in such situations because jurisdictional statutes "speak to the power of the court rather than to the rights or obligations of the parties," Republic Nat. Bank of Miami, 506 U. S., at 100 (Thomas, J., concurring).

27 In Bruner, we specifically noted: "This jurisdictional rule does not affect the general principle that a statute is not to be given retroactive effect unless such construction is required by explicit language or by necessary implication. Compare United States v. St. Louis, S. F. & T. R. Co., 270 U. S. 1, 3 (1926), with Smallwood v. Gallardo, 275 U. S. 56, 61 (1927)." 343 U. S., at 117, n. 8.

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