Cite as: 511 U. S. 368 (1994)
Opinion of the Court
Congress intended all felons to have access to all the procedures specified in the exemption clause, especially because there are many States that do not restore civil rights, either. Because the statutory language is unambiguous, the rule of lenity is inapplicable. See Chapman v. United States, 500 U. S. 453, 463-464. Pp. 370-374.
993 F. 2d 1539 (first case) and 993 F. 2d 1131 (second case), affirmed.
O'Connor, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Nathan Lewin argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Mathew S. Nosanchuk and R. Russell Stobbs.
Edward C. DuMont argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attorney General Harris, Deputy Solicitor General Bryson, and John F. De Pue.
Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court.
Today we construe three provisions of the federal fire-arms statutes:
"It shall be unlawful for any person who has been convicted . . . [of] a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . [to possess] any firearm . . . ." 18 U. S. C. § 922(g).
"What constitutes a conviction . . . shall be determined in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held." § 921(a)(20) (the choice-oflaw clause).
"Any conviction which has been expunged, or set aside or for which a person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored shall not be considered a conviction . . . ." Ibid. (the exemption clause).
The question before us is which jurisdiction's law is to be considered in determining whether a felon "has had civil rights restored" for a prior federal conviction.
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