Cite as: 511 U. S. 383 (1994)
Souter, J., dissenting
embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism . . . or of laissez faire." Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). The dormant Commerce Clause does not "protec[t] the particular structure or methods of operation in a[ny] . . . market." Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U. S. 117, 127 (1978). The only right to compete that it protects is the right to compete on terms independent of one's location.
While the monopolistic nature of the burden may be disregarded, any geographically discriminatory elements must be assessed with care. We have already observed that there is no geographically based selection among private firms, and it is clear from the face of the ordinance that nothing hinges on the source of trash that enters Clarkstown or upon the destination of the processed waste that leaves the transfer station. There is, to be sure, an incidental local economic benefit, for the need to process Clarkstown's trash in Clarks-town will create local jobs. But this local boon is mitigated by another feature of the ordinance, in that it finances whatever benefits it confers on the town from the pockets of the very citizens who passed it into law. On the reasonable assumption that no one can avoid producing some trash, every resident of Clarkstown must bear a portion of the burden Local Law 9 imposes to support the municipal monopoly, an uncharacteristic feature of statutes claimed to violate the Commerce Clause.
By way of contrast, most of the local processing statutes we have previously invalidated imposed requirements that made local goods more expensive as they headed into the national market, so that out-of-state economies bore the bulk of any burden. Requiring that Alaskan timber be milled in that State prior to export would add the value of the milling service to the Alaskan economy at the expense of some other State, but would not burden the Alaskans who adopted such a law. Cf. South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U. S. 82, 92 (1984). Similarly, South Carolinians
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