452
Thomas, J., dissenting
The ability of both carrier and shipper to rely on the tariff on file with the Commission is central to the Act's filed rate provisions. See American Trucking, 467 U. S., at 363- 364, n. 7. Therefore, we have consistently held that "[u]nless and until suspended or set aside, [the rate in the published tariff] is made, for all purposes, the legal rate, as between carrier and shipper." Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern R. Co., 260 U. S. 156, 163 (1922). See also Maislin, supra, at 126. This remains the case even if the filed tariff does not conform with technical filing requirements, see, e. g., Berwind-White Coal Mining Co. v. Chicago & Erie R. Co., 235 U. S. 371 (1914), or violates a clear prohibition in the statute. See Davis v. Portland Seed Co., 264 U. S. 403 (1924) (enforcing tariff rate that unlawfully assessed a higher charge for a shorter shipment than a longer shipment along the same route). As long as a tariff is "received and placed on file by the Commission without any objection whatever . . . [and] as a matter of fact [is] adequate to give notice," that tariff controls. Berwind-White, supra, at 375.
There can be no doubt that petitioner's tariff was sufficiently complete "as a matter of fact" to give notice of the applicable charge. 235 U. S., at 375. Petitioner's tariff was filed with (and accepted by) the Commission and became effective well before the transportation at issue. It has never been suspended or set aside by the Commission or canceled by petitioner. At all times it stated that distances would be determined by reference to the HGCB distance guide—an effective, duly filed tariff. See App. 27. Neither respondent nor the Commission suggests any confusion or ambiguity as to what charge would be due under petitioner's tariff, but for the challenged void-for-nonparticipation rule. As Justice Ginsburg explains, see post, at 458-459, petitioner and respondent could calculate the appropriate charge (if either desired) just as easily after petitioner's participation lapsed
precisely the "secret" rates and the potential for price discrimination that the Act was intended to prohibit. See 49 U. S. C. § 10101(a)(1)(D).
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