Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 28 (1994)

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512

CUSTIS v. UNITED STATES

Souter, J., dissenting

state sentences." Ante, at 497. And the Court does not disturb uniform appellate case law holding that an individual serving an enhanced sentence may invoke federal habeas to reduce the sentence to the extent it was lengthened by a prior unconstitutional conviction. See J. Liebman & R. Hertz, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure § 8.2, pp. 62-64, and n. 13.2, and § 8.4, p. 89, n. 27 (1993 Supp.) (collecting cases).7 From the perspective of administrability, it strikes me as entirely sensible to resolve any challenges to the lawfulness of a predicate conviction in the single sentencing proceeding, especially since defendants there will normally be represented by counsel, who bring efficiency to the litigation (as well as equitable benefits).

III

Because I cannot agree that Congress has required federal courts to impose enhanced sentences on the basis of prior convictions a defendant can show to be constitutionally invalid, I respectfully dissent.

7 Maleng v. Cook, 490 U. S. 488 (1989), holding that a federal habeas court has jurisdiction to entertain a defendant's attack on a sentence to the extent it was enhanced by a prior, allegedly unconstitutional conviction, "express[ed] no view on the extent to which the [prior] conviction itself may be subject to challenge in the attack upon the . . . sentenc[e] which it was used to enhance." Id., at 494 (citing 28 U. S. C. § 2254 Rule 9(a)). Court of Appeals decisions postdating Maleng have uniformly read it as consistent with the view that federal habeas courts may review prior convictions relied upon for sentence enhancement and grant appropriate relief. See Collins v. Hesse, 957 F. 2d 746, 748 (CA10 1992) (discussing Maleng and citing cases). In addition, depending on the circumstances, the writ of coram nobis may be available to challenge a prior conviction relied upon at sentencing, see United States v. Morgan, 346 U. S. 502 (1954); Crank v. Duckworth, 905 F. 2d 1090, 1091 (CA7 1990); Lewis v. United States, 902 F. 2d 576, 577 (CA7 1990), and, if successful, the defendant may petition the sentencing court for reconsideration of the enhanced sentence, see Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 16 (1982).

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