BFP v. Resolution Trust Corporation, 511 U.S. 531, 30 (1994)

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560

BFP v. RESOLUTION TRUST CORPORATION

Souter, J., dissenting

B

I do not share in my colleagues' apparently extreme discomfort at the prospect of vesting bankruptcy courts with responsibility for determining whether "reasonably equivalent value" was received in cases like this one, nor is the suggestion well taken that doing so is an improper abdication. Those courts regularly make comparably difficult (and contestable) determinations about the "reasonably equivalent value" of assets transferred through other means than foreclosure sales, see, e. g., Covey v. Commercial Nat. Bank, 960 F. 2d 657, 661-662 (CA7 1992) (rejecting creditor's claim that resale price may be presumed to be "reasonably equivalent value" when that creditor "seiz[es] an asset and sell[s] it for just enough to cover its loan (even if it would have been worth substantially more as part of an ongoing enterprise)"); In re Morris Communications NC, Inc., 914 F. 2d 458 (CA4 1990) (for "reasonably equivalent value" purposes, worth of entry in cellular phone license "lottery" should be discounted to reflect probability of winning); cf. In re Royal Coach Country, Inc., 125 B. R. 668, 673-674 (Bkrtcy. Ct. MD Fla. 1991) (avoiding exchange of 1984 truck valued at $2,800 for 1981 car valued at $500), and there is every reason to believe that they, familiar with these cases (and with local conditions) as we are not, will give the term sensible content in evaluating particular transfers on foreclosure, cf. United States v. Energy Resources Co., 495 U. S. 545, 549 (1990); NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U. S. 513, 527 (1984); Rosen v. Barclays Bank of N. Y., 115 B. R. 433 (EDNY 1990).12 As in other § 548(a)(2) cases, a trustee seeking

12 It is only by renewing, see ante, at 548, its extreme claim, but see n. 2, supra, that market value is wholly irrelevant to the analysis of foreclosure-sale transfer (and that bankruptcy courts are debarred from even "referring" to it) that the Court is able to support its assertion that evaluations of such transactions are somehow uniquely beyond their ken.

The majority, as part of its last-ditch effort to salvage some vitality for the provision, itself would require bankruptcy judges to speculate as to the

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