60
Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment
double curse of producing neither textually faithful results nor plausibly intended ones. It is best, as usual, to apply the statute as written, and to let Congress make the needed repairs. That repairs are needed is perhaps the only thing about this wretchedly drafted statute that we can all agree upon.
For these reasons, I concur in the judgment of the Court.
Justice Kennedy, concurring in the judgment. The Court's holding that the drug proviso in 18 U. S. C. § 3565(a) calls for a mandatory minimum sentence of two months in prison rests upon two premises: first, that the term "original sentence" means the maximum Guidelines sentence that the district court could have, but did not, impose at the initial sentencing; and, second, that the verb "sentence" means only "sentence to imprisonment." Neither premise is correct. As close analysis of the text and structure of the statute demonstrates, the proviso requires a mandatory minimum sentence of a probation term one-third the length of the initial term of probation. I concur in the judgment only because Granderson, under my reading of the statute, was entitled to release from prison.
I
Section 3565(a) provides, in relevant part:
"If the defendant violates a condition of probation at any time prior to the expiration or termination of the term of probation, the court may . . .
"(1) continue him on probation, with or without extending the term or modifying or enlarging the conditions; or
"(2) revoke the sentence of probation and impose any other sentence that was available under subchapter A at the time of the initial sentencing.
"Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, if a defendant is found by the court to be in possession
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