Cite as: 511 U. S. 661 (1994)
Opinion of O'Connor, J.
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We disagree with Justice Stevensí contention that the test we adopt "provides less protection for a fundamental constitutional right than the law ordinarily provides for less exalted rights." Post, at 695. We have never held that it is a violation of the Constitution for a government employer to discharge an employee based on substantively incorrect information. Where an employee has a property interest in her job, the only protection we have found the Constitution gives her is a right to adequate procedure. And an at-will government employee—such as Churchill apparently was, App. to Pet. for Cert. 70—generally has no claim based on the Constitution at all.
Of course, an employee may be able to challenge the substantive accuracy of the employer's factual conclusions under state contract law, or under some state statute or common-law cause of action. In some situations, the employee may even have a federal statutory claim. See NLRB v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 379 U. S. 21 (1964). Likewise, the State or Federal Governments may, if they choose, provide similar protection to people fired because of their speech. But this protection is not mandated by the Constitution.
The one pattern from which our approach does diverge is the broader protection normally given to people in their relationship with the government as sovereign. See, e. g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S., at 279-280, cited post, at 696, 699 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But the reasons for this are those discussed supra in Part II-B: "[O]ur 'profound national commitment' to the freedom of speech," post, at 699 (Stevens, J., dissenting), must of necessity operate differently when the government acts as employer rather than sovereign.
III
Applying the foregoing to this case, it is clear that if petitioners really did believe Perkins-Graham's and Ballew's
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