Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 34 (1994)

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694

WATERS v. CHURCHILL

Stevens, J., dissenting

sonable? I presume that there has then been established a violation of the procedural component of the First Amendment—the failure to treat possibly protected speech with the requisite "amount of care"—without regard to whether the employee's speech was in fact on a matter of public concern. Justice O'Connor does not reveal what the remedy for this violation is to be. There are various possibilities: One could say that the discharge without observance of the constitutionally requisite procedures is invalid, and must be set aside unless and until those procedures are complied with. Alternatively, one could charge the employer who failed to conduct a reasonable investigation with knowledge of the protected speech that a jury later finds—producing a sort of constructive retaliatory discharge, and entitling the employee to full reinstatement and damages. Or alternatively again, the jury could be required to determine what information a reasonable investigation would have turned up, and then to decide whether it would have been permissible for the employer to fire the employee based on that information.

These are only a few of the numerous questions left unanswered by Justice O'Connor's opinion. Loose ends are the inevitable consequence of judicial invention. We will spend decades trying to improvise the limits of this new First Amendment procedure that is unmentioned in text and unformed by tradition. It seems to me clear that game is not worth the candle, given the adequacy of "pretext" analysis to protect the constitutional interest at stake.

Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Blackmun joins, dissenting.

This is a free country. Every American has the right to express an opinion on issues of public significance. In the private sector, of course, the exercise of that right may entail unpleasant consequences. Absent some contractual or statutory provision limiting its prerogatives, a private-sector

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