United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 37 (1994)

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Cite as: 511 U. S. 39 (1994)

Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting

applicable at the time of the initial sentencing, it would have simply said, 'any other sentence that was available . . . at the time of the initial sentencing,' as it did" in §§ 3565(a)(2) and (b)).

The Court also asserts that its reading of the term avoids according two different meanings to the word "sentence." Yet under the Court's own interpretation, the word "sentence" when used as a verb refers to the imposition of a fixed period of incarceration; but when the word "sentence" next appears, as a noun, the Court concludes that it refers to a range of available punishment. Thus it is the Court's reading of the statute that fails " 'to give . . . a similar construction' " to a word used as both a noun and a verb in a single statutory sentence. See ante, at 46 (quoting Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U. S. 170, 177 (1993)). Under what I think is the correct reading of the statute, all that changes is what the defendant will be (or was) sentenced to—prison or probation; the word "sentence" itself does not change meanings.

The Court next contends that " '[p]robation and imprisonment are not fungible,' " ante, at 46 (citation omitted), and that its interpretation of the statute avoids the "shoal" supposedly encountered when explaining "how multiplying a sentence of probation by one-third can yield a sentence of imprisonment," ante, at 47. Probation and imprisonment, however, need not be fungible for this statute to make sense. They need only both be subsumed under the term "sentence," which, for the reasons previously stated, they are. See Black's Law Dictionary, at 1362 (defining "sentence" as a judgment imposing punishment, which may include "a fine, incarceration, or probation"). While tying the length of imprisonment to the length of the original sentence of probation might seem harsh to the Court, surely it is not an irrational method of calculation. Indeed, the Court does not question that Congress could have tied the length of imprisonment to the length of the original sentence of probation.

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