Cite as: 511 U. S. 738 (1994)
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
wise might have pleaded. This case is illustrative. When charged with driving under the influence, petitioner sought out an attorney, who told him that he did not need a lawyer if he was pleading nolo contendere. This advice made sense if a $250 fine was the only consequence of the plea. Its soundness is less apparent where the consequences can include a 2-year increase in a prison sentence down the road.
IV
With scant discussion of Sixth Amendment case law or principles, the Court today approves the imposition of two years of incarceration as the consequence of an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction. Because uncounseled misdemeanor convictions lack the reliability this Court has always considered a prerequisite for the imposition of any term of incarceration, I dissent.
Justice Ginsburg, dissenting.
In Custis v. United States, ante, p. 485, the Court held that, with the sole exception of convictions obtained in violation of the right to counsel, a defendant in a federal sentencing proceeding has no right to attack collaterally a prior state conviction used to enhance his sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984. This case is dispositively different.
Custis presented a forum question. The issue was where, not whether, the defendant could attack a prior conviction for constitutional infirmity. See ante, at 497 (Custis "may attack his state sentence in Maryland or through federal habeas review").
Here, we face an uncounseled prior conviction tolerable under the Sixth Amendment "assistance of counsel" guarantee only because it did not expose defendant Nichols to the prospect of incarceration. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U. S. 367 (1979). Today's decision enlarges the impact of that uncounseled conviction. It turns what was a disposition allowing
765
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