Cite as: 511 U. S. 825 (1994)
Thomas, J., concurring in judgment
Given my serious doubts concerning the correctness of Estelle in extending the Eighth Amendment to cover challenges to conditions of confinement, I believe the scope of the Estelle "right" should be confined as narrowly as possible. Cf. Helling, supra, at 42 (Thomas, J., dissenting). In Wilson, the Court has already held that the highest subjective standard known to our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence— "maliciou[s] and sadisti[c]" action "for the very purpose of causing harm," Whitley, supra, at 320-321 (internal quotation marks omitted)—"does not apply to prison conditions cases." Wilson, supra, at 303. The Court today adopts the next highest level of subjective intent, actual knowledge of the type sufficient to constitute recklessness in the criminal law, ante, at 837, 839-840, noting that "due regard" is appropriate "for prison officials' 'unenviable task of keeping dangerous men in safe custody under humane conditions.' " 1 Ante, at 845 (quoting Spain v. Procunier, 600 F. 2d 189, 193 (CA9 1979) (Kennedy, J.)).
Even though the Court takes a step in the right direction by adopting a restrictive definition of deliberate indifference, I cannot join the Court's opinion. For the reasons expressed more fully in my dissenting opinions in Hudson and Helling, I remain unwilling to subscribe to the view, adopted by ipse dixit in Estelle, that the Eighth Amendment regulates prison conditions not imposed as part of a sentence. Indeed, "[w]ere the issue squarely presented, . . . I might vote to overrule Estelle." Helling, 509 U. S., at 42 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Nonetheless, the issue is not squarely presented
1 The facts of this case demonstrate how difficult that task can be. When petitioner was taken out of general prison population for security reasons at United States Penitentiary-Lewisburg, he asserted that he "d[id] not need extra security precautions" and filed suit alleging that placing him in solitary confinement was unconstitutional. See Farmer v. Carlson, 685 F. Supp. 1335, 1342 (MD Pa. 1988). Petitioner's present claim, oddly enough, is essentially that leaving him in general prison population was unconstitutional because it subjected him to a risk of sexual assault.
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