Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 8 (1994)

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870

DIGITAL EQUIPMENT CORP. v. DESKTOP DIRECT, INC.

Opinion of the Court

ple punishments, but by its very terms embodies the broader principle, " 'deeply ingrained in . . . the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence,' " that it is intolerable for " 'the State, with all its resources . . . to make repeated attempts to convict an individual [defendant], thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity.' " 431 U. S., at 661-662 (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184, 187-188 (1957)). We found that immediate appeal was the only way to give "full protection" to this constitutional right "not to face trial at all." 431 U. S., at 662, and n. 7; see also Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U. S. 500 (1979) (decision denying immunity under the Speech and Debate Clause would be appealable under § 1291).

Abney's rationale was applied in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 731, 742 (1982), where we held to be similarly appealable an order denying the petitioner absolute immunity from suit for civil damages arising from actions taken while petitioner was President of the United States. Seeing this immunity as a "functionally mandated incident of the President's unique office, rooted in the . . . separation of powers and supported by our history," id., at 749, we stressed that it served "compelling public ends," id., at 758, and would be irretrievably lost if the former President were not allowed an immediate appeal to vindicate this right to be free from the rigors of trial, see id., at 752, n. 32.

Next, in Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511 (1985), we held that similar considerations supported appeal under § 1291 from decisions denying government officials qualified immunity from damages suits. An "essential attribute," id., at 525, of this freedom from suit for past conduct not violative of clearly established law, we explained, is the "entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation," id., at 526, one which would be "effectively lost if a case [were] erroneously permitted to go to trial," ibid. Echoing the reasoning of Nixon v. Fitzgerald, supra (and Harlow v. Fitz-

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