Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 11 (1994)

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Cite as: 512 U. S. 1 (1994)

Opinion of the Court

constitutionally protected." 462 U. S., at 885. Petitioner does not argue that the admission of evidence regarding his prior death sentence allowed the jury to consider, in aggravation, constitutionally protected conduct. Accordingly, our decisions in Dawson and Zant do not support petitioner's contention.

Petitioner also cites Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U. S. 578 (1988), but it, too, is inapposite. There we reversed the imposition of Johnson's death sentence because the only evidence supporting an aggravating factor turned out to be invalid, and because the Mississippi Supreme Court refused to reweigh the remaining, untainted aggravating circumstances against the mitigating circumstances. Id., at 586, 590, n. 8. Similarly, in this case the only evidence supporting the "prior violent felony" aggravating circumstance was the judgment from petitioner's conviction for the Thompson murder. That evidence, like the evidence in Johnson, was rendered invalid by the reversal of petitioner's conviction on appeal.

Here, however, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals struck the "prior violent felony" aggravator, reweighed the three untainted aggravating circumstances against the mitigating circumstances, and still concluded that the death penalty was warranted. See Romano II, supra, at 389, 393- 394. The Court of Criminal Appeals' approach is perfectly consistent with our precedents, including Johnson, where we remanded without limiting the Mississippi Supreme Court's authority to reweigh the remaining aggravating circumstances against the mitigating circumstances. See 486 U. S., at 590; id., at 591 (White, J., concurring); see also Clemons, 494 U. S., at 744-750. Contrary to petitioner's assertion, Johnson does not stand for the proposition that the mere admission of irrelevant and prejudicial evidence requires the overturning of a death sentence.

Petitioner's argument, pared down, seems to be a request that we fashion general evidentiary rules, under the guise of interpreting the Eighth Amendment, which would govern

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