Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339 (1994)

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OCTOBER TERM, 1993

Syllabus

REED v. FARLEY, SUPERINTENDENT, INDIANA

STATE PRISON, et al.

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the seventh circuit

No. 93-5418. Argued March 28, 1994—Decided June 20, 1994

The Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (IAD), a compact among 48

States, the District of Columbia, and the Federal Government, provides that the trial of a prisoner transferred from one participating jurisdiction to another shall commence within 120 days of the prisoner's arrival in the receiving State, Article IV(c), and directs dismissal with prejudice when trial does not occur within the time prescribed, Article V(c). Petitioner Reed was transferred in April 1983 from a federal prison in Indiana to state custody pursuant to an IAD detainer lodged by Indiana officials. Trial on the state charges was originally set for a date 19 days beyond the 120-day IAD period and was subsequently postponed for an additional 35 days. Although Reed's many and wide-ranging pretrial motions contained a few general references to the IAD time limit, he did not specifically object to his trial date until four days after the 120-day period expired. The trial court denied Reed's petition for discharge on the grounds that the judge had previously been unaware of the 120-day limitation and that Reed had not earlier objected to the trial date or requested a speedier trial. Reed then successfully moved for a continuance to enable him to prepare his defense. After his trial and conviction in October 1983, Reed unsuccesfully pursued an appeal and sought postconviction relief in Indiana's courts. He then petitioned for a federal writ of habeas corpus under 28 U. S. C. 2254. The District Court denied relief, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Held: The judgment is affirmed. 984 F. 2d 209, affirmed.

Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, III, and all but the final paragraph of Part IV, concluding that a state court's failure to observe IAD Article IV(c)'s 120-day rule is not cognizable under 2254 when the defendant registered no objection to the trial date at the time it was set, and suffered no prejudice attributable to the delayed commencement. Because Reed failed to make the requisite showing of prejudice, he cannot tenably maintain that his Sixth Amendment speedy trial right was violated. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514, 530. Reed's petition is properly considered under the "fundamental defect" standard set forth in Hill v. United

339

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